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Abstract
We describe a dynamic macroeconomic model that incorporates firm-level borrowing
constraints, competitive CES loan production, and rigidities on both setting prices and
wages. The external finance premium (interest-rate spread) is countercyclical with tech-
nology and financial shocks, and procyclical with consumption spending shocks. The real
effects of financial shocks are significantly amplified when either considering greater rigidi-
ties for price/wage setting or a low elasticity of substitution in loan production (banking
real rigidities). In the monetary policy analysis, a stabilizing Taylor (1983)-style rule per-
forms slightly better when incorporating a positive and small response coefficient to the
external finance premium.
Keywords: financial accelerator, nominal rigidities, real rigidities.
JEL codes: E32, E44.
1 Introduction
During the recent global economic crisis (2007-2012), some countries have experienced GDP
stagnation and a steady increase in the rate of unemployment. As one extreme example, the
rate of unemployment in Spain tripled by increasing from 8.3% in July 2007 to 25.1% in July
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Pamplona, Spain; Tel.: +34 948169336; Fax: +34 948 169721; E-mail: mcasares@unavarra.es (M. Casares).
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2012. Other peripheral economies are currently suffering from unemployment soaring as well
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal). Why did unemployment rise so sharply in the latest economic
recession? The combination of both a rigid labor market and a credit crunch could be one
possible answer to this question. Whether coincidently or not, politicians and policy makers
across the European Union often mention the need for structural reforms in both the labor
market and the banking sector as crucial elements for the economic recovery and the solution
to the current Euro sovereign debt crisis.
This paper explores the interaction between market rigidities and financial frictions. The
analysis relies on a New-Keynesian model with borrowing constraints, sticky prices and sticky
wages, that endogenously provides dynamic equations for output, price inflation, wage infla-
tion, unemployment, and the interest rates on both loans and deposits. The model combines
elements of banking intermediation introduced in Christiano et al. (2010) or Goodfriend and
McCallum (2007), with labor market rigidities that bring unemployment fluctuations as in
Casares (2007). Households supply labor to either banks or firms, and decide how to reallocate
their stock of wealth between equity and bank deposits. Firms employ labor to produce differ-
entiated consumption goods that sell in a monopolistically competitive market. They require
external finance to pay in advance part of their wage bill, which they can borrow from banks.1
Meanwhile, banks obtain liquidity by issuing deposits and transform them into firm-loans by
utilizing a technology that combines labor and collateral in the form of firm-equity. The use of
equity (net worth) as collateral brings in the financial accelerator mechanism, which was first
described by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) in a model with asymmetric information and agency
costs. As two follow-up papers, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) find that endogenous principal-
agent problems generate a hump-shaped response of output to real shocks, and Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) show that collateral constraints might have a large role in amplifying the effects
of economic shocks; including those to the value of collateral.2
1It is implicitly assumed that there is a delay between the moment in which labor is employed in the
production of goods and the moment in which revenue is obtained from selling these goods.
2More recently, another strand of literature looks at the relationship between real rigidities in the labor and
financial markets: Wasmer and Weil (2004) study the interplay between credit and labor market imperfections
in a model with matching frictions, and Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2011) show that a calibrated model
with matching frictions in labor, goods and credit markets does a better job than standard search models at
replicating the persistence and volatility of unemployment fluctuations.
2
Nominal rigidities may also play a crucial role in shaping the persistence and magnitude of
the financial accelerator. Bernanke et al. (1999), show that in the presence of sticky prices á la
Calvo (1983), financial frictions account for a 30% greater response of output to technology and
demand shocks. Our paper brings a contribution to this literature by studying the interplay
between firms’ financial constraints and nominal rigidities on both price and wage setting. In
addition, a CES technology for loan production is introduced to study the financial accelerator
mechanism under different elasticities of substitution in the banking technology (real rigidities).
After presenting a model calibration, the business cycle analysis examine impulse-responses
to three types of idiosyncratic shocks: a technology shock, a financial shock and a consumption
shock. In particular, we look at the spread between the interest rates on loans and deposits
(external finance premium) to check whether financial conditions either propagate or attenuate
the effects of shocks. The results are mix. On the one hand, the external finance premium
is countercyclical after either technology or financial shocks, when output responds stronger
(through the financial accelerator mechanism) as borrowing conditions ease. On the other
hand, the external finance premium turns procyclical after demand shocks which reduces the
impact on output due to tighter financial conditions.
A credit crunch episode has been reproduced in the model by means of a large adverse
financial shock. The model simulations indicate that the magnitude of the real effects of a
credit crunch depends on the degrees of both nominal and real rigidities.3 Hence, sticky wages
are crucial to explain a significant decline in output after the credit crunch. If nominal wages
were fully flexible, production marginal costs, price inflation and nominal interest rates would
drop significantly to wipe away around half of the declining response of output to the negative
financial shock. If both prices and wages can be immediately adjusted, the financial shock is
mostly absorbed through changes in price and wage inflation, whereas the quantities of either
output and employment barely change (by less 10% of what they did under sticky prices and
wages). Alternatively, the volume of real rigidities associated with credit market imperfections
also plays a significant role on the real effects of financial shocks. Hence, a simulated economy
with sticky wages and costly substitutions for equity losses in the banking sector replicates the
large decline in unemployment observed in credit crunch episodes.
3The real effects of financial shocks and financial intermediation disruption have been recently re-examined
by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), and Khan and Thomas (2011).
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Regarding monetary policy analysis, Cúrdia and Woodford (2010), and Gertler and Karadi
(2011) have recently proposed models to study unconventional monetary policy rules that ex-
pands central bank credit intermediation to offset a disruption of private financial intermedia-
tion. In Cúrdia and Woodford (2010), a monetary policy rule á la Taylor (1993) is extended
to accommodate a policy reaction to changes in the external finance premium. Following that
possibility, we evaluate response coefficients under alternative stabilizing criteria and find ro-
bustness on recommending a positive and low coefficient (that does not coincide with Cúrdia
and Woodford’s prescription for a negative coefficient).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next, Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 is devoted to the calibration of model parameters. In section 4, we carry out the impulse-
response analysis to study the effects of technology, financial, and consumption shocks. Sections
5 and 6 show how the model can be applied to describe the real effects of a credit crunch episode
and to design a Taylor-type rule extended with a response coefficient to changes in the spread.
Section 7 reviews the conclusions.
2 The model
In a closed-economy framework, there are infinitely-lived identical households, who supply labor
services and are owners of monopolistically competitive firms and perfectly competitive banks.
Each period, these households decide their supply of labor to either banks or heterogeneous
firms. They also optimally choose the amount of current consumption, and their allocation of
savings in the form of either firms’ equity ownership or bank deposits. Simultaneously, firms
decide their demand for labor, the demand for banking loans, their production of a differentiated
final good to be sold in a monopolistically competitive market and the pricing of that good.
As financial intermediaries, banks determine the demand for labor and collateral (firm equity)
and the supply of loans. Firms demand loans to finance a fraction of their wage bill. The
central bank implements a stabilizing monetary policy rule that sets the nominal interest rate
on deposits. Let us examine separately the economic behavior of the economics agents of the
model.
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2.1 Households
In any period t, the representative household is endowed with the following stock of financial
wealth
xtvt + dt, (1)
where vt is the aggregate equity value, xt is the equity share owned by the representative
household, and dt is the stock of deposits held by the representative household. Note that in
equilibrium, xt = 1 holds, as the representative household is the single owner of the market
portfolio, i.e. of all shares of the existing firms.
Households’ preferences are described by the following instantaneous semi-log utility func-
tion:
U(εct , ct, lt,mt) = e
εct

log ct −Ψl
l
1+γl
t
1 + γl
−Ψm
m
1+γm
t
1 + γm

, (2)
where Ψl, γl,Ψm, γm > 0, and the arguments are an exogenous utility shock, ε
c
t, the number
of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) baskets of consumption goods, ct, the bundle of non-banking labor
services supplied to firms, lt, and the amount supplied of banking labor, mt.
Labor is supplied to both firms and banks. The effective labor income at firms is wtlt (1− ut),
where wt is the real wage collected per unit of employed labor and ut is the per-unit rate of
unemployment. There is no unemployment in the banking sector, which implies that all its units
of labor supply, mt, receive the banking real wage, w
m
t . Moreover, the representative household
collects et dividends per equity share xt of the productive sector, a real interest return r
d
t on
holdings of bank deposits, dt, and a collateral service yield, CSY
v
t , from the holdings of equity,
xtvt. Accordingly, period t real income of the representative household is
wtlt (1− ut) + w
m
t mt + xtet + CSY
v
t xtvt + r
d
t dt. (3)
Income is spent on consumption, on increasing the equity share, and on increasing the stock of
deposits. Thus, the household budget constraint in period t is
wtlt (1− ut) + w
m
t mt + xtet + CSY
v
t xtvt + r
d
t dt ≥ ct + (xt+1 − xt)vt + dt+1 − dt. (4)
The optimizing program consists on maximizing intertemporal utility subject to period budget
constraints. Then, households in period t choose the amount of consumption bundles, ct, the
share of mutualized equity they invest for next period, xt+1, the stock of bank deposits for next
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period, dt+1, and the quantities of non-banking and banking labor they supply , lt and mt, so
as to maximize intertemporal utility4
Max
ct,xt+1,dt+1,lt,mt
Et
∞
j=0
βjeε
c
t+j

log ct+j −Ψl
l
1+γl
t+j
1 + γ
−Ψm
m
1+γm
t+j
1 + γ

subject to
wt+jlt+j (1− ut+j) + w
m
t+jmt+j + xt+jet+j + CSY
v
t+jxt+jvt+j + r
d
t+jdt+j
= ct+j + [xt+1+j − xt+j]vt+j + dt+1+j − dt+j . (5)
The first order conditions of the above maximization problem yield the budget constraint (5)
for period t and
ct :
eε
c
t
ct
− λt = 0, (6)
xt+1 : −λtvt + βEtλt+1

et+1 + vt+1

1 + CSY vt+1

= 0, (7)
dt+1 : −λt + βEtλt+1

1 + rdt+1

= 0, (8)
lt : −e
εctΨll
γl
t + λtwt (1− ut) = 0, (9)
mt : −e
εctΨmm
γm
t + λtw
m
t = 0, (10)
where λt denotes the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint. Note that,
given the above, the equilibrium real interest rate on deposits is reciprocal to the stochastic
discount rate, 
1 + rdt+1
−1
=
βEtλt+1
λt
= βt,t+1, (11)
that introduces βt,t+1 as the stochastic discount factor between current period t and future
period t+ 1.
2.2 Banks
In the banking sector, there is a continuum of identical competitive banks. The representative
bank issues some amount of real deposits, dt, which pay a real interest rate, r
d
t and use the
proceedings to supply real loans, bt, to firms that demand liquidity at the competitive real
4Simultaneously, households choose the composition of the bundles of consumption and labor supply in
relative terms to the ω good variety, ct(ω) and lst (ω). These optimal choices are shown respectively in Sections
1 and 2 of the Technical Appendix.
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interest rate on borrowing, rbt . The production of loans utilizes a technology that combines the
collateral service of equity, vt, and banking labor, mt, through the CES specification:
5
bt = e
εbt [avθt + (1− a)m
θ
t ]
1
θ (12)
where −∞ < θ ≤ 1 is the elasticity parameter, 0 < a < 1 is the equity share coefficient, and εbt
is an exogenous financial productivity shock. The elasticity of substitution between collateral,
vt, and labor used to monitor, mt, is constant at
1
1−θ
. Note that, in the upper bound, θ = 1,
the above production function converges to a linear function with perfect input substitutability
(infinite elasticity), whereas as θ approaches to its lower bound the production function turns
into a Leontief technology, with no substitutability between the two factors (zero elasticity). As
an intermediate case, the Cobb-Douglas technology is particularized by (12) when θ approaches
to 0 and there is a unit elasticity of substitution.
As discussed in Section 4 of the Technical Appendix, the banking elasticity of substitution,
1
1−θ
, inversely determines the size of the response of the marginal cost of producing loans
when there is a change in the amount of loan production inputs. Thus, a low elasticity of
substitution (θ negative and high) implies that the real marginal cost is severely influenced by
relative changes in the use of banking inputs for loan production, which can be interpreted as
a real rigidity on banking activities. Following the terminology used by Gopinath and Itskhoki
(2010), we take the banking elasticity of substitution, 1
1−θ
, as one inverse measure of the level
of real rigidities in the credit market.6
The loan production technology (12) should be interpreted as a reduced form that captures
the fact that — in the presence of informational asymmetries — labor-intensive monitoring ser-
vices and collateral play a crucial role in aligning borrowers’ and lenders’ incentives so that,
other things equal, the amount of loans that a bank is willing to supply increases with both of
them.7
5A log-linear approximation to the loan production technology (12) is derived in Section 3 of the Technical
Appendix.
6Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) define real rigidities as “mechanisms that dampen price responses of firms
because of factors such as strategic complementarities in price setting, real wage rigidity, the dependence of
costs on inputs prices that have yet to adjust, among others.".
7As in the tradition of models with credit frictions based on principal-agent problems and agency costs
initiated by Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
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The optimizing program of the representative bank can be written as follows
Max
mt,vt

rbt − r
d
t

bt − w
m
t mt − CSY
v
t vt
s.to eε
b
t [avθt + (1− a)m
θ
t ]
1
θ = bt,
which results in the following first order conditions
rbt − r
d
t
 (1− a)mθ−1t bt
avθt + (1− a)m
θ
t
− wmt = 0, (m
foc
t )
rbt − r
d
t
 avθ−1t bt
avθt + (1− a)m
θ
t
− CSY vt = 0, (v
foc
t )
and (mfoct ) leads to the equilibrium borrowing interest rate:
rbt = r
d
t +
wmt mt
bt
avθt + (1− a)m
θ
t
(1− a)mθt
. (13)
It should be noticed that rbt and r
d
t co-move together one by one, while the banking spread, r
b
t−
rdt , is endogenously determined by the marginal cost of loan production
wmt
∂bt/∂mt
= w
m
t mt
bt
avθt+(1−a)m
θ
t
(1−a)mθt
.
Moreover, the equilibrium return for the collateral service of equity, obtained from (vfoct ), is
CSY vt =

rbt − r
d
t
 bt
vt
avθt
avθt + (1− a)m
θ
t
,
where plugging the expression for the spread, rbt − r
d
t , obtained above simplifies to
CSY vt =
wmt mt
vt
a
(1− a)

vt
mt
	θ
. (14)
2.3 Firms
In period t, each firm specializes in the production of one differentiated consumption good that
belongs to the Dixit-Stiglitz consumption bundle. For the representative ω firm, the production
technology is given by the following function:
yt(ω) = e
εzt ldt (ω)
α
− Φ, (15)
where yt(ω) is output produced by the ω-th firm, l
d
t (ω) is its labor demand, ε
z
t is an exogenous
economy-wide productivity shock, 0 < α < 1 is a parameter that defines the labor elasticity
of output, and Φ ≥ 0 is a fixed cost. As in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the monopolistically
competitive firm ω faces the following market demand constraint,
yt(ω) =

Pt(ω)
Pt
	
−σ
yt, (16)
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where Pt(ω)
Pt
is the ratio between the price of good produced in the ω-th firm and the aggregate
price level, σ > 1 is the Dixit-Stiglitz constant elasticity of substitution, and yt is aggregate
output.
Introducing a financial friction, we assume that a fraction τ of the real wage bill must be
borrowed to meet cash-flow needs of the firm. Let bdt (ω) denote the amount of borrowing (real
loans) demanded by firm ω and Wt(ω)
Pt
its firm-specific real wage defined as the ratio of the
nominal wage over the aggregate price level. The demand for real loans of firm ω in period t is
bdt (ω) = τ
Wt(ω)
Pt
ldt (ω). (17)
Real loans, bdt (ω), must be reimbursed to the bank by the end of the period. Firms take as given
the real interest on bank loans, rbt , which makes the interest payment of firm ω be r
b
tb
d
t (ω), and
its total earnings (profits, or dividends) be equal to:8
et(ω) =
Pt(ω)
Pt
yt(ω)−
Wt(ω)
Pt
ldt (ω)− r
b
tbt(ω). (18)
In turn, the optimizing program of firm ω consists of choosing the selling price, Pt(ω), the
labor demand, ldt (ω), and the amount of real loans to borrow from the bank, bt(ω), in order to
maximize intertemporal earnings:
Max
Pt(ω),ldt (ω),bt(ω)
∞
j=0
Etβt,t+j

Pt+j(ω)
Pt+j
	1−σ
yt+j −
Wt+j(ω)
Pt+j
ldt+j(ω)− r
b
t+jbt+j(ω)

subject to market and credit constraints
eε
z
t+j ldt+j(ω)
α
− Φ =

Pt+j(ω)
Pt+j
	
−σ
yt+j (19)
bt+j(ω) = τ
Wt+j(ω)
Pt+j
ldt+j(ω) (20)
2.4 Price rigidity
Price setting is governed by a Calvo (1983)-type market signal that comes with a constant
probability 1− η. Then, the optimal choices of Pt(ω), l
d
t (ω), and b
d
t (ω) respectively satisfy:
∞
j=0
ηjEηt βt,t+j

(1− σ)


Pt(ω)
Pt+j

−σ
yt+j
pt+j
+ ξt+j(ω)σ


Pt(ω)
Pt+j

−σ−1 yt+j
Pt+j
	
= 0, (21)
−
Wt(ω)
Pt
+ ξt(ω)
α (yt(ω) + Φ)
ldt (ω)
− ϕt (ω) τ
Wt(ω)
Pt
= 0, (22)
−rbt(ω) + ϕt (ω) = 0. (23)
8A log-linear version of firm earnings is obtained in Section 5 of the Technical Appendix.
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where η is the probability of not being able to set the price in any future period, Eηt is the
rational expectation operator conditional to the lack of optimal pricing in the future, ξt(ω)
is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the demand constraint and ϕt (ω) is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the liquidity constraint. Combining the first order conditions on
labor demand and loans lead to the following real marginal cost9
ξt(ω) =
(1+τrbt)
Wt(ω)
Pt
ldt (ω)
α(yt(ω)+Φ)
. (24)
Solving the first order condition for the optimal price leads to
Pt(ω) =
σ
σ − 1

Eηt

∞
j=0
ηjβt,t+jξt+j(ω)(Pt+j)
σyt+j
Eηt

∞
j=0
ηjβt,t+j(Pt+j)
σ−1yt+j

, (25)
Following Walsh (2010, chapter 8), (25) is approximated by the semi-loglinear expression
Pt(ω) = Pt + (1− βη)Eηt ∞
j=0
βjηjξt+j(ω) + Et ∞
j=1
βjηjπpt+j . (26)
where we have used the standard notation of hat variables to represent log deviations with
respect to their constant steady-state level, e.g. Pt(ω) = log
Pt(ω)P (ω) , and the rate of price
inflation in period t+ j was defined as the log difference of the price level, πpt+j =
Pt+j− Pt+j−1.
Meanwhile, using the log-linearized production function to eliminate labor, the value of
Eηt ξt+j(ω) consistent with (24) is
Eηt ξt+j(ω) = τrbt+j + EηtWt+j(ω)− Pt+j − 1αεzt+j + (1−α)α(1+Φ/y)Eηt yt+j(ω). (27)
Finally, the joint dynamics of firm-level real marginal costs (27) and pricing (26) can be com-
bined to obtain the following inflation equation (New Keynesian Phillips Curve, NKPC)10
πpt = βEtπ
p
t+1 +
1
1+
(1−α)σ
α(1+Φ/y)

πwt − βEtπ
w
t+1

+ (1−η)(1−βη)
η

1+
(1−α)σ
α(1+Φ/y)
ξt. (28)
Price inflation is forward looking and depends on the fluctuations of the aggregate real marginal
cost, ξt, and on the wage inflation effect, πwt − βEtπwt+1. Unlike other NKPC of the literature,
the presence of wage inflation in (28) is explained by the reaction of optimal pricing to firm-
specific wages through their influence in firm-specific real marginal costs. In addition, financial
9It should be noticed that, defining the total cost of the ω firm in period t:
TC(y (ω)) =
Wt+j(ω)
Pt+j
ldt+j(ω) + r
b
t+jτ
Wt+j(ω)
Pt+j
ldt+j(ω),
the real marginal cost is:
ξt(ω) =
∂TC(y(ω))
∂y(ω) =
∂TC(y(ω))
∂ldt (ω)
∂ldt (ω)
∂y(ω) =

1 + τrbt
 Wt(ω)
Pt
ldt (ω)
αyt(ω)
.
10The required algebra is shown in Section 6 of the Technical Appendix.
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frictions have an indirect influence in the dynamics of the NKPC because the real interest
rate on borrowing, rbt , is one of the variables that determine fluctuations in the aggregate real
marginal cost ξt = τrbt + wt − 
yt − lt ,
where the constant term has been ignored.11
2.5 Wage rigidity
We introduce wage rigidity by assuming that workers and owners of each firm face a constant
probability of not being able to revise the labor contract. As in Casares (2007), wage stickiness
is subordinated to the same Calvo probability η that governs price stickiness. The Calvo-style
lottery generates firm’s heterogeneity in the nominal wage, Wt(ω), and in labor demand, l
d
t (ω),
as well as household’s heterogeneity in labor supply, lst (ω). The nominal wage is revised to
make intertemporal labor demand equal to intertemporal labor supply at the firm level. Thus,
the revision of the nominal wage at firm ω would be determined as follows
Eηt
∞
j=0
βjηj

ldt+j(ω)− lst+j(ω) = 0, (29)
where η is the Calvo (1983)-type constant probability of not experiencing a labor contract
revision, Eηt is the rational expectation operator conditional on the lack of revisions in the
future, and

ldt+j(ω)− lst+j(ω) represents the log deviation between the type−ω labor demand
and labor supply in period t+j with j = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞. If wage stickiness is eliminated (η = 0.0),
the wage setting condition (31) would determine a perfect matching between labor supply and
labor demand, ldt (ω) = lst (ω).12 Hence, nominal rigidities on the setting of labor-clearing wages
bring about gaps between the amounts of labor supply (workers provided by the household)
and labor demand (jobs demanded by the firm).13
11Concretely, τrb (where rb is the steady-state real interest rate on loans) has been dropped from the right hand
side of the expression. Ignoring constan terms in dynamic equations imply that all the variables that measure
rates (price inflation, wage inflation, nominal interest rates and real interest rates) represent the relative value
with respect to the corresponding steady-state rate.
12This is the case of an economy with heterogeneous labor and flexible wages, as described in Woodford (2003,
chapter 3).
13Labor fluctuations are considered at the extensive margin (employment) in order to provide a fundamental
interpretation of unemployment. The intensive margin (hours) is shut down by assuming inelastic supply of
hours at a fixed constant level.
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The value of newly-revised nominal wages depends on how firm-level labor demand and
supply enter (29). The optimal labor supply allocation of the representative household implies14
lst (ω) = σwWt(ω) + lst (30)
where Wt(ω) = Wt(ω)−Wt is the relative wage, σw > 1 is the Dixit-Stiglitz constant elasticity
of substitution across different types of labor supply, and lst is the log fluctuation of aggregate
labor supply. Meanwhile, the following relative labor demand is consistent with both the
monopolistically competitive demand function and the production technology
ldt (ω) = − σα (1 + Φ/y) Pt(ω) + lt, (31)
where Pt(ω) = Pt(ω) − Pt is the relative price, and lt is the log fluctuation of aggregate labor
demand. Generalizing (30) and (31) for future t+ j periods and plugging them into (29) lead
to
Eηt
∞
j=0
βjηj

−
σ
α (1 + Φ/y)
Pt+j(ω) + lt+j − σwWt+j(ω)− lst+j = 0. (32)
Due to the Calvo-style setting scheme and abstracting from trend inflation, the conditional
expectations of relative prices and wages are
Eηt Pt+j(ω) = η1−ηπpt − Et j
k=1
πpt+k,
EηtWt+j(ω) = η1−ηπwt − Et j
k=1
πwt+k.
The substitution of the last results in the wage setting expression (34) gives
−
σ
α(1+Φ/y)(1−βη)

η
(1−η)
πpt − Et
∞
j=1
βjηjπpt+j

−
σw
(1−βη)

η
(1−η)
πwt − Et
∞
j=1
βjηjπwt+j

= Eηt
∞
j=0
βjηjut+j ,
(33)
where the rate of unemployment for any t+ j period, ut+j = lst+j −lt+j, is a log-linear approxi-
mation to unemployment as excess supply of labor
ut =
lst − lt
lst
.
Solving (33) for the current rate of wage inflation, it is obtained
πwt =
(1−η)
η
Et
∞
j=1
βjηjπwt+j−
σ
α(1+Φ/y)σw

πpt −
(1−η)
η
Et
∞
j=1
βjηjπpt+j

−
(1−η)(1−βη)
ησw
Eηt
∞
j=0
βjηjut+j ,
14See Section 2 of the Technical Appendix for the proof and further details.
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where making the first difference (πwt − βηEtπ
w
t+1) gives (after some algebra)
πwt = βEtπ
w
t+1 −
σ
α(1+Φ/y)σw

πpt − βEtπ
p
t+1

−
(1−η)(1−βη)
ησw
ut.
Finally, using the inflation equation (28) to replace

πpt − βEtπ
p
t+1

, it is obtained
πwt =
(1−η)
η
Et
∞
j=1
βjηjπwt+j−
σ
α(1+Φ/y)σw

πpt −
(1−η)
η
Et
∞
j=1
βjηjπpt+j

−
(1−η)(1−βη)
ησw
Eηt
∞
j=0
βjηjut+j ,
where making the first difference (πwt − βηEtπ
w
t+1) gives (after some algebra)
πwt = βEtπ
w
t+1 −
σ
α(1+Φ/y)σw

πpt − βEtπ
p
t+1

−
(1−η)(1−βη)
ησw
ut.
Finally, using the inflation equation (28) to replace

πpt − βEtπ
p
t+1

, it is obtained
πwt = βEtπ
w
t+1 − χ1ut − χ2
ξt (34)
where χ1 =
(1−η)(1−βη)
ησw

1 +
σ
α(1+Φ/y)σw
1+
(1−α)σ
α(1+Φ/y)

−1
and χ2 =
σ
α(1+Φ/y)σw
(1−η)(1−βη)
η

1+
(1−α)σ
α(1+Φ/y)


1 +
σ
ασw
1+
(1−α)σ
α(1+Φ/y)

−1
.
The wage inflation equation (34) somehow resembles an old-fashion Phillips curve in the neg-
ative relationship between wage inflation and the rate of unemployment. There is also some
negative effect from fluctuations in the real marginal cost as a consequence of the interdepen-
dence between wage setting and pricing. An increase in firm-specific marginal costs would raise
the relative price and would reduce relative labor demand, which would push nominal wages
downwards in (29).
2.6 Monetary policy
The central bank implements a stabilizing monetary policy by adjusting the nominal interest of
deposits, Rdt , in response to changes in the rate of price inflation, changes in economic activity
(output), and changes in the cost of external finance. The latter corresponds to unconventional
policies that might be desirable in the presence of financial frictions as discussed in Cúrdia and
Woodford (2010). The intervention of the central bank is gradual as determined by this partial
adjustment Taylor (1993)-type rule extended with responses to credit spreads
Rdt = µRR
d
t−1 + (1− µR)

µππ
p
t + µyyt + µEFPEFPt , (35)
where 0 < µR < 1, µπ, µy > 0 and µEFP ≷ 0 are policy coefficients and EFPt denotes
the external finance premium defined by the spread between the interest rates of loans and
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deposits
EFPt = r
b
t − r
d
t . (36)
3 Calibration
Table 1 describes the baseline calibration of the model for quarterly periods. The intertemporal
discount factor is set at β = 0.995, obtained from a rate of intertemporal preference ρ = 0.005
that implies a 2% annualized steady-state rate of return for deposits. The utility function is
logarithmic for consumption, and the banking labor curvature is set at γl = 4.0 in order to bring
a low labor supply elasticity (0.25). By contrast, it is assumed a unit banking labor supply
elasticity, γm = 1.0, to avoid excessive volatility of the banking real wage. The parameters
that measure the weight of disutility of either industrial or banking labor take the values that
normalizes industrial labor at l = 1 in steady state and makes the steady-state real wage be
identical across sectors. It requires Ψl = 0.5038 and Ψm = 103.86.
The labor elasticity in the production of goods is α = 0.64, to bring the standard labor
income share assumed in the RBC literature. The fixed cost is set at the level that places firm
earnings in steady state at 10% of output.15 The CES loan production technology is initially
parameterized to provide a low substitutability between equity and labor (the elasticity of
substitution is 1
1−θ
=0.25 with θ = −3) and the labor share for the steady-state production of
loans is 0.35, as taken in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007). Moreover, the steady-state value for
banking labor is fixed at the number that leaves the external finance premium in steady state at
0.01, i.e. 4% in annualized terms. The resulting value form in steady-state represents a realistic
0.5% of total labor force. As for the coefficient that determines the borrowing requirement for
firms, we assign τ = 0.75 as calibrated in Christiano et al. (2010) for a US business cycle model.
15In steady-state, e
y
= 1− ασ−1
σ


1 + Φ
y

.
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Table 1. Calibration.
Parameter description Value
β, intertemporal discount factor β = 0.995
γl, industrial labor curvature in utility γl = 4.0
Ψl, industrial labor disutility weight Ψl = 0.5063
γm, banking labor curvature in utility γm = 1.0
Ψm, banking labor disutility weight Ψm = 103.86
θ, input substitutability in loan production θ = −3.0
a, equity share in loan production a = 0.9999
τ , share of externally financed wage bill τ = 0.75
σ, Dixit-Stiglitz demand elasticity σ = 5.0
σw, Dixit-Stiglitz labor supply elasticity σw = 4.0
η, probability of price/wage rigidity η = 0.75
α, labor elasticity in good production α = 0.64
Φ, fixed cost in good production Φ = 0.43
µπ, Interest-rate response to inflation µπ = 1.5
µy, Interest-rate response to output µy = 0.5/4
µEFP , Interest-rate response to EFP µEFP = 0.43
µR, Interest- rate smoothing µR = 0.8
εzt = ρzε
z
t−1 + κ
z
t , technology shock ρz = 0.95, σκz = 0.34%
εbt = ρbε
b
t−1 + κ
b
t , financial shock ρb = 0.95, σκb = 1.06%
εct = ρcε
c
t−1 + κ
c
t , consumption shock ρc = 0.80, σκc = 1.12%
The elasticity of substitution across consumption goods is fixed at the standard value σ =
5.0, which implies a 25%mark-up in steady state. The Calvo-type probability for both price and
wage setting is η = 0.75 to have the average frequency of optimal setting at one time per year,
as quite standard in the New Keynesian literature (Erceg et al., 2000). Finally, the monetary
policy rule is designed with the original Taylor (1993) recommended coefficients (µπ = 1.5 and
µy = 0.5/4), a significant interest-rate inertia (µR = 0.8) as suggested by Clarida et al. (2000),
and the coefficient of response to the external finance premium is set at µEFP = 0.43 to match
the relative volatility of US interest-rate spreads reported in Jin et al. (2012).16
16The standard deviation of the external finance premium (interest-rate spread) is 31% of that of output in
15
Finally, the stochastic elements of the model are calibrated for their AR(1) processes. Thus,
technology shocks on either goods or loan production have strong persistence (ρa = ρb = 0.95),
whereas the consumption shock is generated with a more moderate level of persistence (ρc =
0.80). The standard deviations of the innovations of the shocks are calibrated to satisfy a
double criteria. On the one hand, the standard deviation of output fluctuations in the baseline
model is 1.38% to match the value obtained in HP-filtered quarterly real GDP in the US over
the period 1980:1-2012:2. On the second hand, the long-run variance decomposition reports
that 40% of business cycle fluctuations of output are determined by technology shocks on goods
production, 40% by demand-side (consumption) shocks, and 20% by financial innovations.17 In
turn, we set σκa = 0.34%, σκb = 1.06%, and σκc = 1.12%.
Solving the non-linear system of equations included in Section 9 of the Technical Appendix
results in the following steady-state numerical description:18
Table 2. Steady-state numerical solution.
y, output 0.5689
e, earnings 0.0569
v, equity value 11.899
ξ, real marginal cost 0.8000
l, non-banking labor 1.0000
m, banking labor 0.0049
w, real wage 0.2880
b, credit volume 0.2160
rb, interest rate on loans (%, ann.) 6.0
rd, interest rate on deposits (%, ann.) 2.0
EFP , spread (%, ann.) 4.0
CSY v, equity collateral yield (%, ann.) 0.087
quarterly US business cycle data.
17These percentages assumed on the output variance decomposition are roughly in line with the results found
by Christiano et al. (2010) in a DSGE model with financial accelerator estimated with US data and a greater
variety of shocks.
18It should be recalled that total non-banking labor l has been normalized to 1 in the calibration.
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4 Impulse-response analysis
In this section, we examine the dynamic responses of the baseline model to three types of idio-
syncratic shocks: a technology shock, a financial shock, and a private spending (consumption)
shock. The complete set of twenty dynamic equations of the model is displayed in Section 10 of
the Technical Appendix. The size of each shock is one standard deviation of the corresponding
innovation, as calibrated above. Figures 1-3 display plots with the responses in percent devi-
ations with respect to the initial steady-state value, except for price inflation, wage inflation,
the interest rates and the external finance premium (spread) that are given in direct deviations
with respect to their steady-state rates.
4.1 Technology shock
As shown in Figure 1, output reacts with a hump-shaped increase after a positive technology
shock, εat , while unemployment rises due to the reduction in labor demand that accommodates
higher productivity. The real marginal cost falls, which explains a decline of price inflation as a
result of the mark-up pricing policy of firms. Wage inflation slightly falls at the quarter of the
shock and keeps falling gradually in the next quarters, as the combined response of lower labor
demand (high unemployment) and a lower real marginal cost in the wage inflation equation
(34).
Figure 1 shows a decline in the demand for real loans (borrowing). The need for borrowing
is weaker at the firms because the wage bill falls as the number of employed workers decreases.
Both earnings and equity rise with lower real marginal costs and lower interest rates, and the
amount of banking labor falls beyond the reduction of total loans.
The results indicate that credit frictions act as a financial accelerator, characterized by a
countercyclical external finance premium. Since equity rises, the marginal cost of loan produc-
tion falls and the interest rate on borrowing, rbt , turns lower. This would have some additional
effect on the decline of the real marginal cost (rbt directly affects the firm-specific marginal cost
as indicated in equation 24), that would push inflation and interest rates further down, and the
economic activity would expand more. Anyway, the drop of the external finance premium is
not substantial (7 basis points), which makes the quantitative effects of the financial accelerator
be considered rather low.
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Figure 1: Impulse-response functions. Technology shock, 0.34%.
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Figure 2: Impulse-response functions. Financial shock, 1.06%.
4.2 Financial shock
The effects of the financial shock, εbt, can be observed in Figure 2. Initially, the marginal cost
of loan production comes down as banks can produce a higher amount of real loans using the
same quantity of banking inputs. In turn, firms observe a reduction in their cost of borrowing,
rbt . Such lower external finance cost results in a lower marginal cost for good production
and, subsequently, in a lower price inflation when applying mark-up pricing policies. The real
interest rate on deposits goes down, and households reduce savings to increase their current
consumption in the standard IS-type pattern. The financial shock that started in the banking
sector has some expansionary effect in the goods market through higher output produced by
firms to meet desired spending on consumption goods.
Labor demand rises to produce the additional amount of consumption goods, and unemploy-
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ment falls almost proportionally to the increase in labor demand (labor supply barely changes as
shown in Figure 2). For the fraction of firms that are able to reset wages, higher labor demand
leads to wage revisions upwards. Firm earnings increase with lower real marginal costs, while
average equity also rises due to both higher earnings and lower interest rates. The marginal
cost of loan production turns lower and there is a countercylical response of the interest-rate
spread that brings a financial accelerator mechanism. Finally, banking labor falls significantly
to compensate for the increase in banking productivity.
The real-side effects of the financial shock are quantitatively significant (in line with those
found by Christiano et al., 2010, in a DSGE-type estimated model): a financial shock that
moves down the external finance premium in nearly 12 basis points has an impact on both
output and unemployment of a moderate magnitude (between 0.2% and 0.3% deviation with
respect to their steady-state levels). The influence on both price and wage inflation is weaker
as they both increase only between 2 and 4 basis points.
4.3 Consumption (demand) shock
Figure 3 displays the responses obtained in the model when there is an increase in consumption
motivated for a positive innovation in the exogenous shock, εct . Such demand push is satisfied by
firms producing more consumption goods, and charging a higher price when Calvo-type market
conditions allow so. Such increase in prices is explained by the fact that the marginal production
cost rises with the level of production due to decreasing marginal returns to labor. Thus, both
output and price inflation increase. The demand-driven expansion has also immediate effects
in the labor market. Labor demand and employment increase, the rate of unemployment falls,
and wage inflation rises following the higher nominal wages that can be reset during the period.
In the banking sector, the demand for real loans also increases as a consequence of a higher
total wage bill that takes into account the labor market expansion. It explains why banking
labor soars while aggregate equity is falling sue to the asset substitution takin place with higher
interest rates. Remarkably, the external finance premium is procyclical in this case, which would
bring a financial attenuation effect. Since the demand for loans increase, the cost of borrowing
is higher and the economic expansion is buffered by the additional increase observed in the
marginal cost, the rate of price inflation, and the interest rates. The interest-rate spread peaks
by nearly 10 basis points at the time of the shock, which would justify an additional monetary
20
Figure 3: Impulse-response functions. Consumption shock, 1.12%.
21
policy tightening in Taylor-type rule equivalent to 4.3 basis points (recalling the calibration of
µEFP = 0.43 in 35).
5 Application I. A credit crunch episode
Figure 4 illustrates the responses obtained when there is an exogenous large increase in the cost
of borrowing.19 The size of the financial shock is a negative 5% (εb1 = −5.0). The economic
interpretation of this perturbation can be either a lower productivity in loan production tech-
nology (12) or an increase in the external financial requirement of the firms.20 Anyway, such
adverse financial shock raises the external finance premium, rbt − r
d
t , which reduces significantly
the amount of borrowing, and generates a simulated credit crunch episode.
The baseline model with both sticky prices and sticky wages predicts little cuts in nominal
wages and prices, while the external finance premium rises nearly 2% in annualized terms.
Firms observe how their real marginal cost of production increases, while both earnings and
equity value fall to engine the increase of the cost of external finance. Expected deflation
and the increase in the real interest rate on deposits explain why the overall demand suffers a
contraction as households cut their current spending on consumption goods. In turn, output
falls by 1.09% and unemployment rises by nearly 0.98% in the labor market. With falling
inflation and output, the central bank gradually cuts the nominal interest rate when applying
the Taylor-type rule (35), despite the positive response coefficient on the spread.
In the variant with flexible wages, the effects of the financial shock on the real sector of the
economy are cut down significantly (roughly by half, as displayed in Figure 4). As wages fall
immediately to restore equilibrium in the labor market (a sharp decline by more than 10% in
annualized terms), both the real wage and the real marginal cost decline. Price inflation falls
substantially (despite sticky prices) by applying the mark-up policy over decreasing marginal
19The responses of the interest rates, price inflation, wage inflation, and the external finance premium have
been annualized in the diagrams of Figure 4.
20The overall financial constraint, bt = τ
 Wt(ω)
Pt
lt (ω) dw, and the loan production technology, bt = eε
b
t [avθt +
(1− a)mθt ]
1
θ , can be combined to obtain
[avθt + (1− a)m
θ
t ]
1
θ = e−ε
b
t τ
 Wt(ω)
Pt
lt (ω) dw,
where an adverse financial shock can also be interpreted as a rising fraction of the wage bill that must be
financed by the bank.
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costs. In turn, firm equity barely changes and the contractionary effects on output and employ-
ment are quite small (they both decline by 0.52% at most), while the rate of unemployment
remains constant at the steady-state percentage.
Likewise, Figure 4 shows how the effects of the credit crunch on output and unemployment
are also reduced in the model variant with higher substitutability for equity in loan production.
The parameterization of θ = 0.0 in (12) would result in a Cobb-Douglas loan production
technology with unit elasticity of substitution between equity and labor. It implies multiplying
the elasticity by a factor of four from the baseline value of 0.25 with θ = −3.0. A higher
substitutability in loan production can be interpreted as lower real rigidities, in the sense
that banks can take advantage of a less-costly substitution among loan production inputs.
Such strategic complementarity between equity and labor provides a buffering on the cost of
borrowing after an adverse financial shock. Thus, Figure 4 displays that the external finance
premium only rises by 1% with Cobb-Douglas loans (unit elasticity of substitution), half of the
increase observed in the baseline case. In spite of having nominal rigidities on both price and
wage settings, the real effects of the adverse financial shocks are of smaller magnitude. Output
falls by 0.56% and unemployment rises by 0.58%, also around half of the responses observed
with less substitutability of inputs in loan production. The transmission mechanism from the
financial shock to real variables is the same as before: raises external finance, increases the real
interest rate on both borrowing and deposits, reduces spending on consumption goods, and
raises unemployment because of a lower labor demand. The effects are quantitatively smaller
than in the baseline model because the initial increase in the cost of external finance is alleviated
by a more favorable marginal rate of substitution between the collateral capacity of equity and
banking labor.
Finally, the flexible-price, flexible-wage model version brings a mostly-neutralized credit
crunch through price/wage adjustments. Both aggregate prices and wages decline sharply (by
around 5% annualized) at the quarter of the financial shock. The central bank can implement
an aggressive expansionary monetary policy and the nominal interest rate is cut by more than
1%. The real interest rate on deposits barely increases and there is a soft economic contraction.
Volatilities caused by financial shocks
Providing more quantitative results, we have calculated some standard deviations when the
23
Figure 4: Responses to one adverse financial shock, εb1 = −5.0%.
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only source of variability is financial shocks. Thus, innovations of production technology and
consumption preferences are shut down to find out the volatilities obtained with the calibrated
financial shocks. Table 3 gives the results under alternative scenarios for price/wage setting
and real rigidities.
Table 3. Standard deviations conditional to financial shocks (ann., %)
Spread Output Price infl. Wage infl. Unem. rate
Sticky prices/wages (baseline) 1.47 0.63 0.33 0.36 0.54
Flexible wages 1.09 0.18 0.63 2.35 0.00
Cobb-Douglas loans 0.77 0.33 0.17 0.19 0.28
Flexible prices/wages 1.38 0.06 1.10 1.32 0.00
With sticky prices and wages (baseline model), the standard deviations of output and un-
employment are 0.63% and 0.54% respectively, higher than those of either price inflation and
wage inflation. If labor market clears with fully-flexible wages, unemployment has no variability
and the real effects of financial shocks are dramatically reduced as the standard deviation of
output is only 0.18%. By contrast, wage inflation volatility multiplies by a factor of 6. With
Cobb-Douglas loans (θ = 0.0), less-rigid substitutability for equity in loan production brings
significant reductions of output and unemployment variability (standard deviations are cut
approximately by half in Table 3), while the cyclical fluctuations of price and wage inflation
are also weaker than those obtained in the baseline model. If the economy is fully flexible on
both price and wage setting, the real effects of financial shocks are quantitatively very low (the
standard deviation of output is less than one tenth of that in the baseline model), and most of
the adjustment occurs through the strong variability in both price inflation and wage inflation.
Nominal rigidities versus real rigidities
How much of the real effects of the financial shock could be reduced if both prices and wages
could be fully adjusted on a quarter-to-quarter basis? And how much of that could be alterna-
tively obtained by having a more flexible substitutability for equity in loan production? We look
for answers to these questions by re-measuring the volatility of fluctuations when moving either
the nominal rigidity parameter, η, from 0 (fully-flexible prices/wages) to 1 (fixed prices/wages),
and the loan production parameter, θ, from -15.0 (highly rigid loan production, proxy to Leon-
tief technology) to its upper bound 1.0 (flexible loan production with perfect substitutability
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Figure 5: Volatilities and rigidities consitional to financial shocks.
between equity and labor).21 Figure 5 displays the volatilities (annualized standard deviations)
conditional to having financial shocks as the only source of business cycle variability. The
vertical lines in Figure 5 represent the parameter setting in the baseline calibration. Notably,
nominal and real rigidities have equivalent effects on both output and unemployment variabil-
ity. Their standard deviations rise from near-zero values when either nominal or real rigidities
are eliminated to levels around 1% with either full price/wage rigidity (fixed prices/wages with
η = 1), or highly-rigid loan production conditions (near Leontief technology with θ = −10).
As for price/wage inflation, the standard deviations fall with higher nominal rigidities (moving
towards zero as η approaches 1), but they rise with higher real rigidities.
In the case with flexible prices/wages (η = 0 in the top plot of Figure 5), we find that
the standard deviation of output is very close to zero (0.06% reported in Table 3). The high
volatility of prices/wages nearly absorbs the real effects of financial shocks. And in the case
21For the sake of tractability, the real rigidity is measured with −θ instead of the (negative of the) elasticity
of substitution, − 11−θ , which would quickly approach to minus infinity as the model parameterizes the linear
loan production technology (θ = 1).
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without real rigidities (θ = 1 in the bottom plot of Figure 5), the perfect substitutability
between equity and labor also reduces substantially the real effects of financial shocks (the
standard deviation of output is 0.22%), while volatilities of price/wage inflation are very low.
6 Application II. The spread coefficient in Taylor rule
Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) argue that the marginal response of monetary policy to a given
increase in the credit spread must be expansionary, i.e. characterized by a µEFP < 0 coefficient
in the extended Taylor-type rule (35). They suggest that monetary policy should be accom-
modative in the presence of a credit crunch, so that lower interest rates facilitate the economic
recovery. Nevertheless, a reduction of Rdt in response to an increase of the external finance
premium expands the interest-rate spread, which might amplify fluctuations through the finan-
cial accelerator mechanism.22 Moreover, a monetary policy rule must sustain the systematic
response to the spread under all sources of variability in place (technology shocks, demand
shocks and financial shocks in our model), which brings more difficulty on the determination
of a desirable value for µEFP , as recognized in Cúrdia and Woodford (2010).
For a quantitative exercise, we have checked the macroeconomic volatility that results from
alternative parameterization of µEFP . Hence, we have moved the value of µEFP across the
interval between -1 and 1 and calculated the standard deviations obtained in the model for
realistic monetary policy targets: variability of price inflation and unemployment. The selection
criteria proposed is to minimize a loss function that combines the volatilities of price inflation
and unemployment
sdv(πp) + Λsdv(u) (37)
where sdv(πp) is the annualized percent standard deviation of price inflation, sdv(u) is the
percent standard deviation of unemployment, and Λ ≥ 0 is the relative weight assigned to
stabilizing unemployment.
Table 4 shows the optimized values of the coefficients of response to credit spreads under
three alternative stabilizing preferences of the central bank (Λ = 0.0, Λ = 0.5 and Λ = 1.0):
22With further complications in the implementation from the possibility of meeting the lower bound of nominal
interest rates (liquidity trap situations).
27
Table 4. Optimized spread coefficient with alternative stabilizing criteria
Model variant µ∗EFP
Λ = 0.0 Λ = 0.5 Λ = 1.0
Baseline 0.26 0.30 0.32
Flex. wages 0.64 0.64 0.64
Flex. prices/wages, η = 0.0 0.48 0.48 0.48
Cobb-Douglas loans, θ = 0.0 0.39 0.43 0.50
Quasi-Leontief loans, θ = −10.0 0.16 0.18 0.21
Linear production, α = 1.0 0.09 0.15 0.17
No smoothing, µR = 0.0 0.08 0.16 0.16
In contrast to the recommendation of Cúrdia and Woodford (2010), the value of µ∗EFP is
positive and it belongs to the interval between 0.08 and 0.64 in all cases with combined sources
of variability.23 If the central bank gives equal weights to targeting inflation and unemployment
(Λ = 1.0), the value of µ∗EFP tends to be higher, which implies a deeper responsiveness to credit
spreads. With flexible wages, the responses must be more aggressive to stabilize inflation under
any criteria. If substitutability between equity and labor in loan production turns easier (θ = 0.0
as in a Cobb-Douglas loan production technology) µ∗EFP increases, whereas the responsiveness
of the central bank to the credit spread should be lower with a more rigid loan production
(µ∗EFP is lower in the variant with θ = −10.0 relative to the baseline calibration θ = −3.0).
In case of a goods production technology with constant labor productivity (α = 1.0), the
central bank should also be less active in responding to the spread, with lower µ∗EFP under the
three stabilizing criteria. And, if monetary policy does not care about interest-rate smoothing
(µR = 0), the optimized marginal reaction to the spread would be again significantly lower
under the three stabilizing criteria.
23A positive µEFP does not imply central bank reactions that raise interest rates during a credit crunch
episode. As shown in Figure 4, the nominal interest rate on deposits falls as a joint reaction to inflation, output,
and the external finance premium put forth in the extended Taylor-type rule (35).
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Table 5. Standard deviations (%) with alternative spread coefficients, [sdv(y), sdv(πp), sdv(u)]’
µEFP= −1.0 µEFP= 0.0 µEFP= 1.0 µ
∗
EFP
Baseline
1.84
1.28
2.12
1.24
0.83
1.32
2.00
1.08
1.58
1.31
0.80
1.23
Flex. wages
4.01
8.95
0.00
1.60
1.85
0.00
1.69
1.43
0.00
1.66
1.35
0.00
Flex. prices/wages, η = 0.0
1.76
5.80
0.00
1.76
4.06
0.00
1.76
4.07
0.00
1.76
3.79
0.00
Cobb-Douglas loans, θ = 0.0
1.44
1.01
1.65
1.24
0.82
1.32
1.46
0.85
1.30
1.28
0.80
1.26
Quasi-Leontief loans, θ = −10.0
2.78
1.79
3.06
1.24
0.85
1.32
3.71
1.96
2.97
1.34
0.80
1.21
Linear production, α = 1.0
1.82
1.03
1.87
1.14
0.61
1.12
1.66
0.97
1.48
1.12
0.60
1.09
No smoothing, µR = 0.0
1.80
1.37
2.09
1.22
0.94
1.36
1.97
1.22
1.64
1.24
0.91
1.31
Finally, Table 5 shows the standard deviations of output, price inflation and unemployment
obtained under alternative policy responses to the interest-rate spread. Particularly, there
is a comparison between the active tightening to spread (µEFP= 1.0), the active loosening
to spread (µEFP= −1.0), the no reaction policy (µEFP= 0.0), and the reaction policy that
minimizes the loss function (37) with stabilizing preferences marked at Λ = 0.5 (in the column
µ∗EFP ). The non-active policy (µEFP= 0.0) might be considered a benchmark reference as it
brings a conventional Taylor-style rule. If the central bank reacts to the spread with one-to-
one monetary tightening (µEFP= 1.0), the stabilizing performance worsens significantly in all
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cases except for those with flexible wages and/or prices. If the central bank chooses interest-
rate cuts in response to an increase in the spread, µEFP= −1.0, the standard deviations turn
generally higher than those with µEFP= 1.0, and the performance is also worse than with a
traditional Taylor-style rule. Finally, the comparison between columns labeled µEFP= 0.0 and
µ∗EFP indicates that the lack of reaction to the spread only slightly worsen off the stabilizing
performance. The standard deviations of either inflation or unemployment never increase by
more than 10%, when replacing the optimized coefficient µ∗EFP for µEFP= 0. Thus, a Taylor
rule with no spread coefficient keeps most of its stabilizing capacity in this model with financial
frictions and endogenous spreads.
7 Conclusions
The introduction of external finance in the optimizing problem of the firm makes the cost
of borrowing be one additional component of the marginal cost of production. In turn, the
interest rate of loans affects decisions on setting prices, wages, labor demand and the amount
of output produced. The external finance premium is obtained endogenously as the marginal
cost of loan production in the banking sector. When financial conditions turn tighter and,
subsequently, the interest rate of loans rises, the firm faces higher marginal costs and charges
higher prices that make a deeper contraction of economic activity. Moreover, the use of firm
equity as collateral for the production of loans opens the possibility of a financial accelerator
for business cycle fluctuations: an increase in firm equity cuts the cost of loan production and
reduces the external finance premium required to firms.
Simulations of the baseline model, with sticky prices and wages, indicate that the borrowing
requirement of firms brings about a financial accelerator effect, quantitatively small, when
there is a technology shock. Firm earnings and equity rise, the external finance premium falls
countercyclically and firms cut prices and increase production further. By contrast, in the
presence of a demand-side consumption shock the credit constraint results in some financial
attenuation. Equity value falls due to decreasing productivity and higher interest rates, which
pushes up the cost of borrowing and the economic activity does not expand as much as initially
pushed.
We devoted a special attention to the effects of financial shocks. In the baseline model, a 1%
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financial innovation increases output and reduces unemployment by approximately 0.2%. These
responses of output and unemployment to financial innovations are quite sensitive to changes
in the level of nominal and real rigidities in place. If nominal wages were fully flexible, the
real effects of financial shocks would be cut by half. If nominal rigidities are totally eliminated
for both price and wage adjustments, the decline of output after an adverse financial shock is
less than one tenth of the one observed with sticky prices and wages. Alternatively, a higher
elasticity of substitution in loan production (less real rigidities) can also reduce significantly
the real effects of financial shocks.
A central bank that is concerned on stabilizing inflation and unemployment by implementing
a Taylor-type monetary policy rule should include a coefficient of response to the external
finance premium. The effective reaction to any increase in the credit spread should be low
and of positive sign. This result is robust to changes in either nominal rigidities on price/wage
setting or in real rigidities on banking production. With no reaction to the spread (conventional
monetary policy), the stabilizing properties of the Taylor-type rule would slightly worsens off.
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Technical Appendix (Not for publication)
1. Household optimal consumption variety.
Moreover, for a given desired level of aggregate consumption, ct, the representative household
decides ct(ω) so to solve the following maximization problem:
Max
ct(ω)
 F
0
ct(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
 σ
σ−1
s.to : ct =
 F
0
Pt(ω)
Pt
ct(ω)dω
The optimal allocation of differentiated consumption goods requires substitution across differ-
entiated consumption goods as determined by the following demand curve24
ct(ω)
ct
=

Pt(ω)
Pt
	
−σ
,
where σ > 1 is the Dixit-Stiglitz constant elasticity of substitution.
2. Household optimal labor supply allocation.
As in Casares (2007), the labor supply bundle is a CES composite of firm-specific amounts
of labor supplied
lst =

lst (ω)
1+σw
σw dω
 σw
1+σw
,
while the aggregate nominal wage is also obtained with a CES aggregation scheme
Wt =

Wt(ω)
1+σwdω
 1
1+σw
.
The optimal allocation of labor supply across firms is determined by solving the problem:
Max
lst (ω)

Wt(ω)l
s
t (ω)dω
s.to : lst =

lst (ω)
1+σw
σw dω
 σw
1+σw
The first order condition yields
Wt(ω)− κt (l
s
t )
−
1
σw lst (ω)
1
σw = 0,
where κt is the Lagrangian multiplier. The optimal relative labor supply becomes
lst (ω)
lst
=

Wt(ω)
κt
	σw
.
24Proof available in Walsh (2010, pages 331-332).
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As a standard result in monopolistically competitive markets, the Lagrange multiplier κt coin-
cides with the aggregate price index. In this case the price index is the nominal wage. Inserting
lst (ω) =


Wt(ω)
κt
σw
lst in the CES labor supply bundle gives
lst =
 Wt(ω)
κt
	σw
lst
	 1+σwσw
dω

σw
1+σw
=
lst
κ
σw
t

(Wt(ω)
σw)
1+σw
σw
dω
 σw
1+σw
,
which can be solved for κt as follows
κt =

Wt(ω)
1+σwdω
 1
1+σw
≡ Wt.
Replacing κt with Wt in the optimal relative supply equation, it is obtained
lst (ω)
lst
=

Wt(ω)
Wt
	σw
.
3. Log-linearized equations for the banking sector
a. CES production function.
Taking the CES production function of external borrowing, bt = e
εbt [avθt + (1− a)m
θ
t ]
1
θ , and
powering to θ gives
bθt = e
θεbt [avθt + (1− a)m
θ
t ],
from where we can obtain the loglinear approximation
θbt = θεbt + avθssavθss+(1−a)mθss θvt + (1−a)mθssavθss+(1−a)mθss θ mt,
where variables topped with the hat denote log deviations respect to the steady state level, e.g.bt = log 
 btbss , and ss supercripts stands for steady-state levels. Defining Ω = avθssavθss+(1−a)mθss
as the steady-state contribution of equity for loan production and dropping the θ’s leaves the
previous expression as follows
bt = εbt +Ωvt + (1− Ω) mt.
b. Spread equation.
Let us define the marginal product of banking labor as
gmt ≡
∂bt
∂mt
= eε
b
t(1− a)mθ−1t [av
θ
t + (1− a)m
θ
t ]
1
θ
−1 =
(1− a)mθ−1t bt
avθt + (1− a)m
θ
t
,
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so that the equilibrium interest rate on borrowing (loans) can be rewritten as
rbt = r
d
t +
wmt
gmt
.
Multiplying both sides by gmt , we get
(rbt − r
d
t )gmt = w
m
t .
(Log)-linearizing, using the approximation xt ≃ xt−xssxss , and dropping constant terms, it is
obtained
rbt − r
d
t = (r
b
ss − r
d
ss) ( wmt − gmt) .
Finally, loglinearizing the marginal product of banking labor results in
gmt = (θ − 1) mt +bt − Ωθvt − (1− Ω)θ mt = Ω(θ − 1) (mt − vt) + εbt ,
and inserting the result in the spread equation leads to
rbt = r
d
t + (r
b
ss − r
d
ss)( wmt − Ω (θ − 1) (mt − vt)− εbt).
c. Collateral service yield of equity.
Define the marginal return on equity for loan production
gvt ≡
∂bt
∂vt
= eε
b
tavθ−1t [av
θ
t + (1− a)m
θ
t ]
1
θ
−1 =
avθ−1t bt
avθt + (1− a)m
θ
t
,
so that the expression relative to CSY vt can be rewritten as
CSY vt =

rbt − r
d
t

gvt .
A semi-loglinear approximation, using xt ≃ xt−xssxss and dropping constant terms gives
CSY vt =
CSY vss
rdss − r
d
ss

rbt − r
d
t

+ CSY vssgvt ,
where gvt = (θ − 1) vt+bt−Ωθvt− (1−Ω)θ mt = (1− Ω) (θ − 1) (vt − mt) + εbt can be plugged
to reach
CSY vt =
CSY vss
rdss − r
d
ss

rbt − r
d
t

+ CSY vss (1− Ω) (θ − 1) (vt − mt) + εbt .
It can be noticed that the equivalent expression for the collateral yield of equity
CSY vt =
wmt mt
vt
a
(1− a)

vt
mt
	θ
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brings the semi-loglinear approximation
CSY vt = CSY
v
ss (wmt + (θ − 1) (vt − mt)) ,
where replacing wmt with the value implied by the expression for rbt − rdt  above, turns into
CSY vt = CSY
v
ss

1
(rbss − r
d
ss)

rbt − r
d
t

+Ω(θ − 1) (mt − vt) + εbt + (θ − 1) (vt − mt)	 ,
and simplifies to (A17) below.
4. Real rigidities on loan production at the bank.
The total cost of loan production is
TC(bt) = w
m
t mt + CSY
v
t vt
Equilibrium input prices (from first order conditions on demand for banking labor and collat-
eralizing equity) are:
wmt =

rbt − r
d
t
 (1− a)mθ−1t bt
avθt + (1− a)m
θ
t
, (mfoct )
CSY vt =

rbt − r
d
t
 avθ−1t bt
avθt + (1− a)m
θ
t
. (vfoct )
Inserting wmt and CSY
v
t in the TCt(b) function gives
TC(bt) =

rbt − r
d
t
 (1−a)mθ−1t bt
avθt+(1−a)m
θ
t
mt +

rbt − r
d
t
 avθ−1t bt
avθt+(1−a)m
θ
t
vt.
Subsequently, the marginal cost of loan production is equal to the spread
MC(bt) =
∂TC(bt)
∂bt
= rbt − r
d
t .
The spread is endogenously determined in the model
rbt − r
d
t = MC(bt) =
wmt
(1−a)mθ−1t bt
avθt+(1−a)m
θ
t
.
After loglinearizing (and simplifying), log deviations from steady state of the marginal cost of
producing a loan at the bank is
mcbt = wmt +Ω(1− θ) (mt − vt) ,
where Ω is the steady-state ratio Ω = av
θ
avθ+(1−a)mθ
.
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Let us recall that θ ∈ (-∞, 1] in the loan production technology, and the elasticity of sub-
stitution is 1
1−θ
. Approaching the lower limit of θ  −∞, loan production follows a Leontief
technology with a zero constant elasticity of substitution. In the expression for mcbt, a very
high and negative θ, (θ = −1000 for example), implies that the change in the relative use of
banking inputs (mt − vt) has to be very small to avoid high marginal costs of loan produc-
tion. That might be considered a "real rigidity" for loan production in the sense discussed by
Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010).
Alternatively, a Cobb-Douglas type loan production (θ = 0) gives mcbt = wmt +Ω (mt − vt),
allowing for large substitutions mt−vt without increasing significantly mcbt because 0 < Ω < 1
by definition. That could be consider quite a"flexible loan production technology".
5. Log-linearized equation for aggregate firm earnings
Firm earnings and the real marginal cost for the ω representative type are, respectively,
et(ω) =
Pt(ω)
Pt
yt(ω)−

1 + τrbt
Wt(ω)
Pt
ldt (ω),
and
ξt(ω) =
(1+τrbt)
Wt(ω)
Pt
ldt (ω)
α(yt(ω)+Φ)
.
Inserting the value of

1 + τrbt
 Wt(ω)
Pt
ldt (ω), obtained from the expression of ξt(ω), into the
earnings equation results in
et(ω) =
Pt(ω)
Pt
yt(ω)− ξt(ω)α (yt(ω) + Φ) = yt(ω)

Pt(ω)
Pt
− ξt(ω)α
	
− ξt(ω)αΦ.
Earnings per output for firm ω yield
et(ω)
yt(ω)
=

Pt(ω)
Pt
− ξt(ω)α
	
− ξt(ω)α
Φ
yt(ω)
.
The loglinear approximation for the expression of earning per output gives
et(ω)−yt(ω) = 1
1− α(σ−1)(1+Φ/y)
σ


 Pt(ω)− Pt− α(σ−1)σ ξt(ω)− α(σ−1)Φ/yσ
1− α(σ−1)(1+Φ/y)
σ

ξt(ω)− yt(ω) ,
and grouping terms
et(ω) = 1
1− α(σ−1)(1+Φ/y)
σ

 Pt(ω)− Pt− α(σ−1)(1+Φ/y)σ
1− α(σ−1)(1+Φ/y)
σ
ξt(ω)+

1 +
α(σ−1)Φ/y
σ
1− α(σ−1)(1+Φ/y)
σ
yt(ω).
The aggregation across all firms et =  et(ω)dω leads to
et = − α(σ−1)(1+Φ/y)σ
1− α(σ−1)(1+Φ/y)
σ
ξt +

1 +
α(σ−1)Φ/y
σ
1− α(σ−1)(1+Φ/y)
σ
yt,
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which is equivalent to
et = − α(σ−1)(1+Φ/y)σ−α(σ−1)(1+Φ/y)ξt + 
1 + α(σ−1)Φ/yσ−α(σ−1)(1+Φ/y) yt.
6. Price inflation equation (New Keynesian Phillips Curve)
As discussed in Subsection 2.4 of the main text, the optimal choice of pricing at firm ω
under Calvo-type rigidities leads to the relative price
Pt(ω)− Pt = (1− βη)Eηt ∞
j=0
βjηjξt+j(ω) + Et ∞
j=1
βjηjπpt+j.
The relative real marginal cost for firm ω is defined as its log deviation with respect to the
aggregate real marginal cost, ξt+j(ω) = ξt+j(ω)− ξt+j. Hence, the log-linearized fluctuation of
the firm-level real marginal cost, shown in equation (24) of the main text, implies the following
relative real marginal cost
ξt+j(ω) = EηtWt+j(ω) + (1−α)α(1+Φ/y)Eηt yt+j(ω) = EηtWt+j(ω)− (1−α)σα(1+Φ/y)Eηt Pt+j(ω),
whereWt+j(ω) = Wt+j(ω)−Wt+j and Pt+j(ω) = Pt+j(ω)− Pt+j are, respectively, relative wages
and prices for firm ω, and the loglinearized demand equation (16) from the main text was also
used to introduce relative prices from relative output, yt+j(ω)− yt+j = −σ Pt+j(ω). Meanwhile,
the relative wage conditional to the lack of future wage resetting is
EηtWt+j(ω) = Wt(ω)−Wt+j = Wt(ω)−Wt +Wt − EtWt+j ,
where using the definition of wage inflation in period t + j, πwt+j = Wt+j − Wt+j−1, we can
substitute
j
k=1 π
w
t+k =
Wt+j −Wt to obtain
EηtWt+j(ω) = Wt(ω)− Et j
k=1
πwt+k,
Similarly, the conditional expectation of the relative price depends upon the current relative
price and the expected price inflation stream as follows
Eηt Pt+j(ω) = Pt(ω)− Et j
k=1
πpt+k
The last two expressions are inserted in the expression for ξt+j(ω) to obtain
ξt+j(ω) = Wt(ω)−Et j
k=1
πwt+k −
(1−α)σ
α(1+Φ/y)
Pt(ω)−Et j
k=1
πpt+k
	
,
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and the relative price, Pt(ω)− Pt = Pt(ω), from the above expression becomes
Pt(ω) = (1− βη)Eηt ∞
j=0
βjηj
ξt+j +Wt(ω)−Et j
k=1
πwt+k −
(1−α)σ
α(1+Φ/y)
Pt(ω)− Et j
k=1
πpt+k
		
+ Et
∞
j=1
βjηjπpt+j ,
which simplifies in the following way

1 + (1−α)σ
α(1+Φ/y)
 Pt(ω) =Wt(ω)−Et ∞
j=1
βjηjπwt+j+


1 + (1−α)σ
α(1+Φ/y)

Et
∞
j=1
βjηjπpt+j+(1− βη)
∞
j=0
βjηjEtξt+j.
As a standard result, Calvo-type sticky prices/wages implies a proportional relationship between
relative prices/wages in logs and the rate of price/wage inflation
Pt(ω) = η1−ηπpt ,Wt(ω) = η1−ηπwt .
Using both relationships into the previous expression yields

1 + (1−α)σ
α(1+Φ/y)

η
1−η
πpt =
η
1−η
πwt −Et
∞
j=1
βjηjπwt+j+


1 + (1−α)σ
α(1+Φ/y)

Et
∞
j=1
βjηjπpt+j+(1− βη)
∞
j=0
βjηjEtξt+j,
or, alternatively,
πpt =


1 + (1−α)σ
α(1+Φ/y)

−1

πwt −
(1−η)
η
Et
∞
j=1
βjηjπwt+j

+ (1−η)
η
Et
∞
j=1
βjηjπpt+j
+ (1−η)(1−βη)
η


1 + (1−α)σ
α(1+Φ/y)

−1 ∞
j=0
βjηjEtξt+j .
Taking the difference (πpt − βηEtπ
p
t+1) in the last expression, the following New Keynesian
Phillips curve can be obtained
πpt = βEtπ
p
t+1 +
1
1+
(1−α)σ
α(1+Φ/y)

πwt − βEtπ
w
t+1

+ (1−η)(1−βη)
η

1+
(1−α)σ
α(1+Φ/y)
ξt.
8. Log-linearized overall resources constraint
Household budget constraint
wtlt (1− ut) + w
m
t mt + xtet + CSY
v
t xtvt + r
d
t dt = ct + (xt+1 − xt)vt + dt+1 − dt. (H)
Competitive bank zero-profit condition
rbt − r
d
t

bt = w
m
t mt + CSY
v
t vt (B)
40
Deposit-to-loan equality condition
bt = dt (D)
Portfolio investment equilibrium condition
xt = xt+1 = 1 (I)
Aggregate earnings
et =

et(ω)dω =
1
Pt

Pt(ω)yt(ω)dω −
1
Pt

Wt(ω)l
d
t (ω)dω − r
b
t

bt(ω)dω.
et = yt − wtl
d
t − r
b
tbt, (F)
with aggregate output, yt =
1
Pt

Pt(ω)yt(ω)dω, aggregate labor income, wtl
d
t =
1
Pt

Wt(ω)l
d
t (ω)dω,
and aggregate real loans (borrowing), bt =

bt(ω)dω.
Inserting (D) in (B), and the result and both (I) and (F) in (H) yields
wtlt (1− ut) + w
m
t mt + yt − wtl
d
t − r
b
tbt + CSY
v
t vt + r
b
tbt − w
m
t mt − CSY
v
t vt = ct + dt+1 − dt,
which simplifies to the overall resources constraint
yt = ct + dt+1 − dt, (ORC)
recalling the definition of unemployment to do lt (1− ut)− l
d
t = 0. Since the change in deposits
is zero in steady state, the loglinearized overall resources constraint (ORC) is
yt = ct.
41
9. Set of steady-state relationships
rb = rd +
wm
b
avθ + (1− a)mθ
(1− a)mθ
CSY v = w
a
(1− a)

m
v
1−θ
v =
β
1− β (1 + CSY v)
e
rd = ρ
e = (1− αξ) y
ξ =

1 + τrb

wl
αy
ξ =
σ − 1
σ
b = τwl
b = [avθ + (1− a)mθ]
1
θ
w = Ψll
γlc/(1− u)
wm = Ψmm
γmc
y = lα − Φ
y = c
u = 0
We get fourteen non-linear equations that may provide solutions for the fourteen endogenous
variables: y, c, l, v, e, w, wm, u, b, rb, rd, CSY v, ξ and m.
10. Set of log-linear dynamic equations
πwt = βEtπ
w
t+1 − χ1ut − χ2
ξt (A1)
πpt = βEtπ
p
t+1 +
1
1+
(1−α)σ
α(1+Φ/y)

πwt − βEtπ
w
t+1

+ (1−η)(1−βη)
η

1+
(1−α)σ
α(1+Φ/y)
ξt (A2)
wt = wt−1 + πwt − πpt (A3)
ut = lst − lt (A4)
yt = (1 + Φ/y)
εzt + αlt (A5)
ct = Etct+1 − Rdt −Etπpt+1+ (1− ρc) εct (A6)
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vt = β (1 + CSY vss)Etvt+1 + EtCSY vt+1 + β rdss + CSY vssEtet+1 − Etrdt+1 (A7)
et = − α(σ−1)(1+Φ/y)σ−α(σ−1)(1+Φ/y)mct + 
1 + α(σ−1)Φ/yσ−α(σ−1)(1+Φ/y) yt (A8)
mct = τrbt + wt − (1 + Φ/y)−1 yt + lt (A9)
yt = ct (A10)
Rdt = µRR
d
t−1 + (1− µR)

µππ
p
t + µyyt + µEFPEFPt (A11)
rbt = r
d
t + (r
b
ss − r
d
ss)( wmt − Ω (θ − 1) (mt − vt)− εbt) (A12)bt = wt + lt (A13)
bt = εbt +Ωvt + (1− Ω) mt (A14)lst = 1γl ( wt − ct − ut) (A15)
mt = 1
γm
(wmt − ct) (A16)
CSY vt = CSY
v
ss

1
(rbss − r
d
ss)

rbt − r
d
t

+ (1− θ) (1− Ω) (mt − vt) + εbt	 (A17)
rbt = R
b
t −Etπ
p
t+1 (A18)
EFPt = r
b
t − r
d
t (A19)
rdt = R
d
t − Etπ
p
t+1 (A20)
Endogenous variables (20): πwt , π
p
t , r
b
t , r
d
t , R
d
t , R
b
t , CSY
v
t , yt, lt, lst , ut, ct, wt, wmt , mct, et,vt, bt, mt, and EFPt.
Exogenous variables (3): AR(1) processes determine the evolution of the technology shock,
εzt = ρzε
z
t−1+ κ
z
t , the financial shock, ε
b
t = ρbε
b
t−1 + κ
b
t, and the private spending (consumption)
shock, εct = ρcε
c
t−1 + κ
c
t .
11. The non-monetary decentralized economy without nominal rigidities
Taking the baseline model with financial frictions, dropping the central bank interest-rate
setting equation, and assuming both flexible prices and flexible wages bring the set of equations:
lt = 1
γl
( wt − ct − ut) (A1’)
wt = (1 + Φ/y)−1 yt − lt (A2’)
yt = ct (A3’)
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yt = (1 + Φ/y)
εzt + αlt (A4’)
ct = Etct+1 − rdt + (1− ρc) εct (A5’)
vt = β (1 + CSY vss)Etvt+1 + EtCSY vt+1 + β rdss + CSY vssEtet+1 − Etrdt+1 (A6’)
et = 
1 + α(σ−1)Φ/yσ−α(σ−1)(1+Φ/y) yt (A7’)
EFPt = (r
b
ss − r
d
ss)( wmt − Ω (θ − 1) (mt − vt)− εbt) (A8’)bt = wt + lt (A9’)
bt = εbt +Ωvt + (1− Ω) mt. (A10’)
mt = 1
γm
(wmt − ct) (A11’)
CSY vt = CSY
v
ss

1
(rbss − r
d
ss)
EFPt + (1− θ) (1− Ω) (mt − vt) + εbt	 , (A12’)
EFPt = r
b
t − r
d
t (A13’)
There are 13 endogenous variables: rbt , r
d
t , CSY
v
t , yt, lt, ct, wt, wmt , et, vt, bt, mt, and EFPt.
The model can be solved for real variables, but nominal variables (inflation, nominal interest
rates) are undetermined.
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